Abstract. Halevi, Lindell, and Pinkas (CRYPTO 2011) recently proposed a model for secure computation that captures communication patterns that arise in many practical settings, such as secure computation on the web. In their model, each party interacts only once, with a single centralized server. Parties do not interact with each other; in fact, the parties need not even be online simultaneously.
Introduction
Most of the literature on secure multi-party computation assumes that all parties remain online throughout the computation. Unfortunately, this assumption is problematic in many emerging environments, where the parties are often disconnected from the network due to geographic or power constraints. Moreover, the protocols typically require each party to broadcast a large number of messages to the other parties, which can be quite impractical in large distributed networks. We would like to minimize interaction to the greatest extent possible due to practical communication and bandwidth considerations -ideally, each party would need to send only one message.
We consider secure computation in a one-pass client-server model put forth in a recent work of Halevi, Lindell and Pinkas [12] . 5 In this model, there is a single server and multiple clients, and the goal is for the server to securely compute some function of the inputs held by the respective clients. Each client connects to the server once (hence "one-pass") and interacts with it, without any other client necessarily being connected at the same time. In particular, there is no need for any two clients to interact. This model is applicable in settings where maintaining constant network connectivity can be problematic -for example, when deployed troops are communicating with the central command center. It is also applicable in situations where the participants cannot be coordinated for social reasons. Imagine trying to get thirty program committee members across different time zones online at the same time to cast a vote. Instead, in the one-pass model, each will receive an email instructing them to login to the server at their leisure. When all participants have done so, the server can compute the output and post the data to a website (or email it out). Similarly, if a website would like to gather data from its visitors, it is unreasonable to ask that they remain logged-in to the site for the duration of the computation. Instead, as they login, they can upload the relevant data according to the protocol, assured of their privacy, and the server can compute the agreed-upon function offline.
Security for the One-Pass Model
We briefly outline the security model for the one-pass client-server setting and previous results of Halevi et al. [12] -hereafter, "HLP." First, observe that secure computation in this setting is easy if the server is always honest, and is trusted with user data: each client simply sends its input to the server, encrypted under the server's public key; the server will then perform all of the computation. However, assuming that the server is completely honest is not realistic. Instead, we aim to protect the privacy of the honest parties' inputs even amidst a malicious server that may collude with some subset of the clients. Together with the requirement that the protocol be onepass, this imposes inherent limitations on what we can securely compute in this model. To see why this is the case, consider parties P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n computing some function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where party P i holds x i and the parties go in order P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n . If the server colludes with the last t parties, then the correctness and one-pass nature of the protocol imply that the coalition can compute the "residual function" f (x 1 , . . . , x n−t , ·, · · · , ·), on any choice of a t-tuple (z n−t+1 , . . . , z n ), and for arbitrarily many such choices. In other words, inherent to this one-pass model is the fact that parties P 1 , . . . , P n−t must disclose enough information about their inputs to allow the remaining parties to correctly evaluate the residual function f (x 1 , . . . , x n−t , ·, · · · , ·). Once the last parties have this information, nothing can prevent them from using it repeatedly. This is in stark contrast to the standard interactive model for secure computation, where the adversary only learns the output of the computation on a single set of inputs, and which allows us to securely compute every efficiently computable function [19, 10] . 5 The ideas of "non-interactive" and "one-pass" computations can be further traced back to [18, 14] . See Section 1.3.
Due to these inherent limitations of the one-pass model, the "best possible" security guarantee that one could hope for is that the protocol reveals no more information than what is revealed by oracle access to this residual function f (x 1 , . . . , x n−t ). Throughout this paper, this will be the notion we mean when we refer to security (following [12] , we will also refer to this notion as optimal privacy); for completeness, we provide the formal definitions in Section 2.2. HLP [12] presented practical optimally private protocols for sum of inputs, selection, and symmetric functions like majority, and leave as an open problem whether we can obtain practical optimally private protocols for some larger classes of functions. Indeed, there is no clear candidate for such a larger class of functions as the previous protocols are somewhat ad-hoc and seem to rely on different ideas.
Even ignoring the issue of practical efficiency, the aforementioned functions are essentially the only ones for which we have optimally private protocols. The main technical challenge in designing optimally private protocols is as follows: on one hand, the view y i of the server after interaction with party P i should encode sufficient information about the first i inputs x 1 , . . . , x i to be able to compute the function f ; on the other hand, in order to establish security, the simulator needs to be able to efficiently reconstruct the view y i given only oracle access to the residual function f (x 1 , . . . , x i , ·, · · · , ·). HLP formalize this via the notion of minimum-disclosure decomposition, which is a combinatorial property of the function itself, providing a necessary condition for the existence of an optimally private protocol. In addition, they demonstrate that every function with this combinatorial property admits some optimally private protocol, albeit a highly inefficient one. However, beyond the small classes of functions mentioned above, they do not demonstrate that any function has such a property. Indeed, using pseudorandom functions, they demonstrate that not all functions have a minimum-disclosure decomposition.
Our results
We present practical, optimally private protocols for two broad classes of functions: (1) sparse polynomials over large domains, which capture many algebraic and arithmetic functions of interest, such as mean and variance, and (2) read-once branching programs, which capture symmetric functions, string matching, classification algorithms and some classes of finite automata and decision trees (c.f. [15, 14] ). 6 Together, these two classes capture all of the functions addressed in the previous work of HLP, and also include many more functions of interest. One such concrete example is a second-price auction (the n-party functionality that returns the index of the largest value along with the second largest value). This function is asymmetric, but can be represented as a branching program. A second-price auction with n parties and discrete bids in the range {1, . . . , k} has an associated branching program of width nk 2 .
For convenience, we provide a summary of our results in Figure 1 . We begin by giving a simplified exposition of the protocols (achieving security against semihonest adversaries), and outlining the simulation strategies used in the proof of security. In particular, the simulation strategies provide a solution to the minimum-disclosure decomposition problem.
Computing sparse polynomials. Consider a sparse 7 polynomial F in n variables X 1 , . . . , X n , where party P i holds an input x i for variable X i . The parties go in the order P 1 , . . . , P n . Consider the following polynomial:
Informally, party P i will post to the server an encryption of the coefficients of polynomial F i . The next party P i+1 will homomorphically evaluate an encryption of (the coefficients of) F i+1 given its input x i+1 and the previous encryption of F i (Figure 2 ). To do so, the encryption scheme must be homomorphic with respect to affine functions over the integers. We are able to realize such an encryption scheme from the DCR assumption, which leads to a one-pass protocol for computing sparse polynomials over Z N , where N is a RSA modulus. Overall, each party does O(M ) group operations and sends O(M ) group elements, where M is an upper bound on the number of monomials in F .
Obtaining coefficients of F i using the coefficients of F i−1 and the value of x i . Shaded boxes are encrypted values. Operations on arrows are homomorphic operations possible in an additively homomorphic scheme.
To establish security of this protocol, we must show a simulator that can efficiently reconstruct the coefficients of F i given oracle access to appropriate residual function, which in this case is F i itself. (For technical reasons, the simulator needs to reconstruct not just the encrypted coefficients but the coefficients themselves.) We show that by querying F i on sufficiently many random points, the simulator can obtain the coefficients of F i by solving a suitable system of linear equations.
Computing branching programs. Consider a layered read-once branching program, where party i holds the input x i in the i'th layer. Our protocol proceeds by evaluating the branching program in a bottom-up manner, "percolating" output labels from the end of the branching program towards the start node. Accordingly, we label the output layer of the branching program L 0 , and layers L 1 , . . . , L n proceed up from there. The parties go in order P 1 , . . . , P n , and party P i will post to the server an encryption of the output labels on all of the nodes in the i'th layer. The next party, P i+1 , generates an encryption of labels in layer i+1, given x i+1 and an encryption of labels in the i'th layer (Figures 3 & 4) . Due to the simplicity of the percolation operation, it suffices to use an encryption scheme which is homomorphic with respect to the identity map (i.e., re-randomizable). Such an encryption scheme may be realized from the DCR, DDH and DLIN assumptions (the latter two instantiations are important for compatibility with Groth-Sahai proofs [11] ). Overall, each party does O(w) group operations and sends O(w) group elements, where w is an upper bound on the width of the branching program. To establish security of this protocol, we must show a simulator that can efficiently compute the labels that the protocol assigns to the layer corresponding to the last honest party, given oracle access to the appropriate residual function. For each node u in the i'th layer, the simulator runs a depth-first search to find a path to u from the start node in the branching program. The path determines a set of inputs on which to query the residual function; the result of the query will be the label on the node u.
The full-fledged protocol: more details. The outline above is a little over-simplified. The parties will in fact need to use a homomorphic threshold encryption scheme, which is also re-randomizable, in order to provide "circuit privacy" (that is, hide the homomorphic operations). Roughly speaking, the i'th party P i 's message will be encrypted under the public keys of parties P i+1 , . . . , P n and the server, so that the message will be private unless all of these parties and the server are corrupted. The use of homomorphic threshold encryption here is analogous to previous constructions [12] .
The protocols outlined above obtain optimal privacy against only semi-honest adversaries. To achieve security against malicious adversaries, we can use a generic GMW-style compiler via noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs in the random oracle model, in line with previous work. For our branching-program protocol, we provide an alternative method, in the standard model, that relies on Groth-Sahai proofs. The same approach does not apply to our polynomial-evaluation protocol, since it requires an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, and none are known that are compatible with Groth-Sahai proofs.
As with previous constructions, our protocols can often be extended to handle arbitrary ordering of the players (which is useful in such an asynchronous interaction setting). Indeed, this is the case for our polynomial evaluation protocols. Our branching-program protocol can also allow for arbitrary ordering if the function computed is such that the branching program can be adjusted "on the fly" based on the order in which the parties show up; this is the case for all symmetric functions, as well as some asymmetric ones such as the second-price auction mentioned above.
Finally, we note that while the previously known constructions of [12] are captured as special cases of our two protocols, our technical novelty over these previous constructions is two-fold. First, for our polynomial-evaluation protocol we provide a novel threshold homomorphic encryption scheme based on the DCR assumption. This is important for extending the expressivity from simple summations to more general polynomials while keeping the protocol practical. 8 Second, proving security for our constructions (in particular, proving that the functions admit minimum-disclosure decompositions) requires much more sophisticated simulation strategies than those required by the previous work. In particular, for the classes of functions considered previously, there is no need to solve systems of linear equations or solve s-t connectivity, as we do in this work.
Additional related work
Related constructions. Surprisingly, our result statements are similar to the results of Harnik, Ishai and Kushilevitz [13, Section 4] for a very different problem. They showed how to securely compute branching programs and sparse polynomials 9 , where every pair of parties makes a single call to an oblivious transfer channel. In their setting, as in ours, the parties incrementally maintain a succinct representation of the inputs of the first i parties. Beyond that similarity, however, the security goal and the underlying communication model are very different. Specifically, they achieve security in the standard MPC setting where the simulator calls the ideal functionality once (there is no "one pass" restriction); indeed, our simulation strategy is very different from theirs. An interesting open problem is to adapt their result on linear branching programs to our setting; the key technical obstacle appears to be solving the analogue of s-t connectivity on the computation graph for linear branching programs.
Related models. There is a large body of work considering the general theme of secure computation with a restricted communication pattern. Sander, Young and Yung [18] were the first to put forth the notion of 'non-interactive' secure computation, but only in the context of two-party computation. Extensions to the multi-party setting were addressed recently in the work of Ishai et al. [16] . These are essentially 'two-pass' protocols, where it is still possible to securely compute any efficiently computable function. Secure computation in two passes was also recently considered by Asharov et al. [1] .
The notion of one-pass computation was considered by Ibrahim, Kiayias, Yung and Zhou [14] . The notion of security is however quite different -roughly speaking, they do not allow the server to collude with the clients, which is in some sense the main source of technical difficulty in the model we study here; their main goal is to minimize server's storage. Ibrahim et al. also provided an efficient protocol for computing branching programs in their model. We note that their protocol is very different from ours: (1) the computation is done in a top-down manner, whereas ours is done in a bottom-up manner; and (2) the transitions from one layer to the next is encoded using a degree w polynomial where w is the width of the branching program, and the parties homomorphically evaluate a degree w polynomial on ciphertexts. The authors showed how to realize the latter based on only the DCR assumption, whereas our protocol may be based on either the DDH, DLIN, or DCR assumptions. The idea for evaluating branching programs in a bottom-up manner originates in a paper of Ishai and Paskin [15] in a different context; their main result exploits the DCR assumption to obtain short ciphertexts.
Other related works. We also point out that both classes of functions we consider in this work have been studied in several recent works in a variety of different settings [4, 3, 17, 15, 14] .
Organization. We summarize the general one-pass framework [12] (including minimum-disclosure decomposition) Section 2. We provide a generic protocol construction in Section 3, and show how to apply it to computing polynomials and branching programs in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. We provide concrete instantiations for underlying primitives in Section 6.
General Framework
We design our protocols in the registered public-key infrastructure (PKI) model [2] . We assume that in an initial setup phase every party registers a public and private key pair with a central authority and all the public keys are made known to everyone. We discuss the exact assumptions in Appendix A.
Decompositions
As described above, we prove that our protocols leak only the minimum possible information, even if the server colludes with some of the players. We assume that parties P 1 , . . . , P n interact with the server in order, with P 1 going first and P n going last. 10 As in [12] , we define a decomposition of the function f that the players are computing, by a sequence of functions f 1 , . . . , f n .
Definition 1 (Decomposition).
For a function f : D n → R, we define a decomposition of f by a tuple of n functions, f 1 , . . . , f n , where
Minimum-Disclosure Decompositions: As in the work of Halevi et al. [12] , we use the notion of a minimum-disclosure decomposition to argue that our protocols reveal as little information as possible. For a function f , a decomposition of f given by f 1 , . . . , f n , some fixed inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and for all i ∈ [n], we define the residual function
Definition 2 ([12]).
A decomposition of function f , given by f 1 , . . . , f n , is a minimum-disclosure decomposition if there exists a probabilistic, black-box simulator S that for any set of inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) having total length m, and any i ∈ [n], when S is given black-box access to an oracle computing g x i (·), the output of the simulator satisfies S g x i (·) (m, n, i) =f i (x 1 , . . . , x i ), and the running time of S g x i (·) (m, n, i) is polynomial in m and n.
Defining Security
Security is defined using the real/ideal world paradigm [9, 12] . In the ideal world, there is a trusted party that computes f , which is represented by some fixed decomposition, f 1 , . . . , f n . Each party P i gives input x i to the trusted party. If P i is honest, or semi-honest, he simply uses the value x i that was found on his input tape; a malicious P i (z), with auxiliary information z, may use any input of his choice. We denote the corrupted set of parties by I ⊂ {P 1 , . . . , P n+1 }. If P n+1 / ∈ I (i.e. if the server is honest), the trusted party sends output f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to the server. If P n+1 ∈ I, then we let i * denote the largest index such that P i * / ∈ I (i.e. P i * is the last honest party). The trusted party ignores inputs (x i * +1 , . . . , x n ) and sendsf i * (x 1 , . . . , x i * ) to the adversary controlling I. In this case, we stress that the trusted party does not send f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), although this can of course be computed by the adversary once he is givenf i * (x 1 , . . . , x i * ). This subtlety becomes important while proving security, because the simulator will have no way to extract the input of malicious party P j for j > i * .
In the real world, f is computed by a sequence of protocols π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ), where π i is a two-party protocol between the server and P i . Each party P i uses input x i in π i , and, as above, if they are honest or semi-honest, they use the input found on their input tape. The server uses his output from π i−1 as input to π i . Each player is also given all n + 1 public keys, denoted by pk, which are set up as described at the beginning of this Section.
Let S(z) denote an ideal-world adversary holding auxiliary input z and corrupting some set of parties I. On input set x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and security parameter κ, we denote the output of S(z) and server P n+1 by Idealf ,S(z),I (x, z, 1 κ ). Let A(z) denote a real-world adversary holding auxiliary input z and corrupting the set of parties I. On input set x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and security parameter κ, we denote the output of A(z) and server P n+1 by Realf ,A(z),I (x, z, pk, 1 κ ).
Definition 3 ([12]
). We say that a protocol π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) securely computes a decomposition f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) with optimal privacy, if π is a minimum decomposition forf , and if for any nonuniform, PPT adversary A(z) corrupting some subset of parties I in the real-world, there exists a non-uniform, PPT adversary S(z) corrupting I in the ideal-world such that
Homomorphic threshold encryption
Our constructions require a (n-out-of-n) threshold encryption scheme which supports the following properties in addition to the standard Enc, Dec, and Gen procedures: (These properties generalize the "layer re-randomizable encryption" in [12, Definition 4.1].)
-To encrypt to a set of users whose corresponding public keys comprise the set S, one simply aggregates their public keys via pk ← Aggregate(S), and then encrypts normally treating pk as a normal public key. -The scheme is homomorphic (with respect to a class of functions we specify later when describing our main protocols). More formally, there is a procedure Eval which takes a (possibly aggregated) public key, a ciphertext, and a function, and outputs another ciphertext. We then require that for all valid keypairs (sk, pk), all supported functions f , and all ciphertexts C:
-Given an encryption C under public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n , the owner of any corresponding secret key sk i , i ∈ [n], can transform C into a (fresh) encryption of the same message, under the remaining n − 1 public keys.
More formally, there is a procedure Strip which takes a (aggregated) public key, a secret key, and a ciphertext, and outputs another ciphertext. We require that, for all valid keypairs (sk * , pk * ), all S pk * , all plaintexts M , and all C in the support of Enc(Aggregate(S), M ), we have
Semantic Security. For an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) we define the advantage AdvThEnc A (k) to be:
A threshold encryption scheme is said to be indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage AdvThEnc A (k) is a negligible function in k.
Our General Protocol
Our protocols are designed using the following high-level approach, which is essentially an abstraction of that in [12] .
1. We begin with a decomposition for the class of functions we are interested in, namely sparse polynomials and read-once branching programs, as described in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. We show that our decompositions are in fact minimal, proving that our protocols are optimally private for these classes of functions. 2. We construct a semi-honest protocol by combining the decomposition with a threshold homomorphic encryption scheme. (See Section 3.1.) For our constructions, the only homomorphic operations we need to support are the identity function and affine functions. In Section 6, we provide concrete instantiations from DDH, DCR and DLIN. 3. We construct a protocol that is secure against malicious parties by having the participants first encrypt their inputs and then prove consistency using suitable NIZKs. We provide a detailed treatment in the design of NIZKs, where we completely specify the witnesses used by the honest provers. (Some of these details were omitted in [12] .) These results appear in Appendix B.
Protocol for Semi-Honest Adversaries
We consider n parties P 1 , . . . , P n , with corresponding registered key pairs {(pk i , sk i )} i∈ [n] . Let f 1 , . . . , f n be a decomposition for f in which the parties go in order 1, . . . , n. Our protocol is as follows: At a high level, party i sends to the server the ciphertext C i , which is an encryption of the value y i := f i (y i−1 , x i ) =f i (x 1 , . . . , x i ) under the aggregated public key pk i = Aggregate(pk i+1 , . . . , pk n+1 ). Ciphertext C i is generated by applying the encryption scheme's homomorphic properties to ciphertext C i−1 . In more detail:
) and sends C 1 to the server P n+1 . 2. For i = 2, . . . , n: party P i receives C i−1 from the server, and sends C i to the server, where:
3. Upon receiving C n from P n , the server P n+1 decrypts the ciphertext using its secret key sk n+1 and outputs the result.
From the properties of Eval and Strip, it is easy to see that if all players are honest, then C i ≈ s Enc( pk i , y i ) for all i. Correctness then follows from the fact that f 1 , . . . , f n is a correct decomposition.
Lemma 1 (Semi-honest security). If (Gen, Enc, Dec, Aggregate, Eval, Strip) is a secure threshold encryption scheme (Section 2.3), then the above protocol is an optimally private protocol for decomposition (f 1 , . . . , f n ), against semi-honest adversaries.
Computing Sparse Multivariate Polynomials
In this section we instantiate our general framework to obtain a protocol for evaluating a multivariate polynomial on the parties' inputs. We begin with a simple lemma about learning the coefficients of a multivariate polynomial via oracle queries:
be the number of monomials in F . Fix an (unknown) input to the polynomial (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ (Z N ) n and define:
Then, for each i, it is possible to learn the coefficients of the polynomial F i by making a polynomial number (in M and log N ) of queries to an oracle for F i .
Proof. Our approach for learning the coefficients of F i is to simply query F i on a sufficiently large number of random points (the number of points to be determined later). Then the coefficients of F i can be viewed as unknowns in a linear system over Z N , which can be solved via Gaussian elimination. We must show that the linear system uniquely determines F i with high probability.
Fix i and recall that F is fixed and known. Let us say that a monomial m in variables {X i+1 , . . . , X n } is valid if there exists some monomial m ∈ F (with nonzero coefficient) such that the degree of X j is the same in both m and m, for all j ∈ {i + 1, . . . n}. Since F i is of the form F (x 1 , . . . ,x i , X i+1 , . . . , X n ), every monomial of F i must be valid. Then we may restrict our linear system to polynomials whose monomials are all valid, by including unknowns only for the coefficients of valid monomials. Recall that there are at most M valid monomials. Now, it suffices to show that the linear system uniquely determines F i , among polynomials that contain only valid monomials.
Let p be a prime divisor of N . Fix any polynomial F = F i , where F contains only valid monomials. Then by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, we have that F i and F agree on q randomly selected points (modulo p) with probability at most (d/p) q ≤ 1/2 q . There are at most N M such multivariate polynomials F , and at most log N prime divisors of N , so choose q = M k log N log log N . Then by a union bound, we have that F i agrees with some other F on all q random points modulo some prime divisor with probability at most 1/2 k . By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the linear system over Z N uniquely determines F i with probability at least 1 − 1/2 k .
Function decomposition. The preceding lemma suggests that, given a sparse polynomial F , we may compute its minimum-disclosure decomposition as follows: f i (·, x i ) takes as input the list of coefficients for a polynomial P (X i , X i+1 , . . . , X n ) and outputs the list of coefficients for the polynomial P (X i+1 , . . . , X n ) where P (X i+1 , . . . , X n ) := P (x i , X i+1 , . . . , X n ).
Specifically, f i proceeds as follows:
1. For each monomial of P that contains a term of the form X t i , multiply that coefficient by x t i . 2. For each set of monomials whose degrees in X i+1 , ..., X n are identical, add the coefficients together.
This next Lemma follows directly from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. The decomposition described above is a minimum-disclosure decomposition.
Secure, one-pass protocols. It is easy to see that f i (·, x i ) is an affine function of its inputs. Therefore, using our general framework in the preceding section, it suffices to construct a threshold homomorphic encryption scheme that supports computing affine functions on encrypted values. Indeed, we provide such an instantiation based on DCR in Appendix C.3.
Theorem 1.
Under the DCR assumption, there is a one-pass protocol, secure against a semi-honest adversary, for evaluating any F ∈ Z N [X 1 , . . . , X n ] with M monomials, where N is a RSA modulus and M and the total degree of F satisfy the bounds given in Lemma 2. The protocol achieves optimal privacy, its runtime is polynomial in M , n, and log N , and it requires O(M ) exponentiations per party.
In Section 6 and Appendix D, we will demonstrate concrete instantiations of the NIZKs described in Appendix B. This leads to the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. Under the DCR assumption, there is a one-pass protocol in the random-oracle model, secure against malicious adversaries, for evaluating any F ∈ Z N [X 1 , . . . , X n ] expressed as a sum of monomials, where N is as in Lemma 2. The protocol achieves optimal privacy and it requires O(nM |D|) exponentiations per party (where D denotes the input domain for each party).
Computing Branching Programs
In this section we describe our protocol for computing branching programs.
Overview. A (deterministic) branching program P is defined by a directed acyclic graph in which the nodes are labeled by input variables and every nonterminal node has two outgoing edges, labeled by 0 and 1. 11 An input naturally induces a computation path from a distinguished initial node to a terminal node, whose label determines the output. We rely on a technique of Ishai and Paskin [15] for computing branching programs (BPs) in a bottom-up manner. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be the inputs to the BP. First, without loss of generality we may make the BP layered (defined below), incurring at most a quadratic blow-up in its size (this blow-up may be avoided in specific cases, see [15] ). In a layered BP, all nodes can be partitioned into layers L 0 , . . . , L n , with the property that all nodes in layer i ∈ {1, . . . , n} correspond to input variable X i and have outgoing edges only into layer i − 1. (Because we work in a bottom-up manner, we label the output layer L 0 , and the topmost layer L n .) Layer 0 contains only output nodes.
Imagine evaluating a layered BP by "percolating" output labels from the end of the BP towards the start node, as follows. 12 Starting at layer L 0 , we do the following: For every edge (u, v) between layer L i and L i−1 that is labeled with the value x i (that is, if we are at node u and X i assumes the value x i , we proceed to node v), copy the output label from node v to node u (there will not be a conflict by the deterministic property of the branching program). Finally, the start node in layer L n is labeled with the output of the computation.
This process naturally lends itself to a decomposition of the branching program's functionality. Namely, the ith phase of the decomposition outputs the labels of all nodes in layer i. To show that this decomposition is minimum-disclosure, we must argue that an adversary could also learn this information by corrupting the server and parties i + 1 through n in the ideal world. To see why, first assume that all nodes in the branching program are reachable from the start node. Then a path from the start node to some node v in layer i naturally corresponds to a set of inputs that the adversary could query to the residual function. The result of the query is the label that this process would have assigned to node v.
Definitions.
We proceed with the details of our protocol:
Definition 4 (Branching program).
A branching program on variables X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) with input domain D and output range R is defined by a tuple {G = {V, E}, S out , φ V , φ E }. V contains a single start node with in-degree 0, and a set of designated leaf nodes, S out , along with any internal nodes. The function φ V assigns each node in S out with an output value from R, and every other node with a variable from X. φ E is a function that labels each edge (u, v) ∈ E with values from D.
Definition 5 (Read-Once, Layered BP). In a layered branching program, V can be partitioned into layers L n , . . . , L 1 , L 0 = S out such that for any node u ∈ L i and v ∈ L j , with i > j, the length of every path from u and v is exactly i − j. A layered branching program is read-once if every node in layer i is labeled with variable X i (possibly after re-naming the variables).
Informally, we can think of every node in layer i as having the same height, and the same variable assignment. Looking ahead, layer i will coincide with the input variable of player P i . We note that any branching program can be turned into a layered branching program with at most a quadratic blowup in the size of V . For simplicity, we will assume that our branching programs are already read-once, layered branching programs.
Function decomposition. Let F : D n → R denote the function on X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) described by a read-once, layered branching program BP . Let s i = |{v ∈ L i }| denote the size of layer i in BP . We assume some (arbitrary) ordering on the nodes in each layer: let (v 1 , . . . , v s i ) be the ordered nodes of layer i, and (u 1 , . . . , u s i−1 ) the ordered nodes in layer i − 1. We define f i : R s i−1 × {x i } → R s i as follows. Let in j ∈ R denote the jth input to f i , and out k ∈ R denote the kth output. Then out k = in j if and only if (v k , u j ) ∈ E, and φ E (v k , u j ) = x i .
Intuitively, this decomposition percolates the output "up" the graph, stripping off layers as it goes. For example, f 1 (φ V (S out ), x 1 ) fixes the variable X 1 = x 1 in layer 1, and percolates the resulting output values from layer 0 up to each node in layer 1. The output nodes in S out now become irrelevant to the computation. Similarly,
off layers 0 through i − 1, labeling all the nodes in layer i with the correct output, and making all layers j < i irrelevant. More specifically, consider two nodes u j ∈ L i and v k ∈ S out . If there exists some path p = (e i , . . . , e 1 ) from u j to v k such that (φ E (e i ), . . . , φ E (e 1 )) = x i , . . . , x 1 , theñ f i (x 1 , . . . , x i ) assigns φ V (v k ) to node u j .
Lemma 4. The decomposition of F described above is a minimum-disclosure decomposition.
Proof. We must show that for every i ∈ [n], there exists a simulator S g x i (·) (m, n, i), that outputs f i (x 1 , . . . , x i ). Recall that the output off i contains s i = |{v ∈ L i }| values, out 1 , . . . out s i ∈ R. To compute the value of out j , the simulator takes the jth node u j in layer L i and runs a breadthfirst-search on G to find a path from the start node to u j . Let x n , . . . , x i+1 denote the input assignments associated with the edges along this path (according to φ E ). S queries his oracle and sets out j = g x i (x i+1 , . . . , x n ).
Secure, one-pass protocols. To obtain a secure protocol using our framework in Section 2, we need to specify the homomorphic operation required by party P i . It is easy to verify that we only need to re-randomize ciphertexts. By our conventions for homomorphic encryption (Section 2.3), rerandomization is performed when P i strips his secret key's contribution from the ciphertext. We do not require any homomorphic operations beyond this. A formal description of the protocol is in Figure 5 .
Branching Programs Inputs: Player Pi holds input xi ∈ {0, 1}. Each also has a full description of the branching program, BP = {G = {V, E}, Sout, φV , φE} Let Li = {v1, . . . , vs i } denote the nodes in layer i.
Protocol:
Player P1 begins the protocol. For each vj ∈ L1, -P1 finds u ∈ Sout such that (u, vj) ∈ E and φE(u, vj) = x1.
-He computes ψj = Enc( pk2, φV (u)). P1 sends C1 := (ψ1, . . . , ψs 1 ) to the server.
For i = 2 . . . n:
-Party Pi receives ciphertexts Ci−1 = (ψ1, . . . , ψs i−1 ) from the server.
-For every vj ∈ Li, • Pi finds u k ∈ Li−1 such that (u k , vj) ∈ E and φE(u k , vj) = xi. We let ψ k denote the ciphertext corresponding to u k .
• Pi sets ψ j = Strip( pki, ski, ψ k ).
-Pi sends Ci := (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ s i ) to the server.
Output: Let Cn be the (single) ciphertext sent from Pn to the server. The server computes and outputs Dec(skn+1, Cn). Theorem 3. Assuming an encryption scheme satisfying the conditions of Section 2.3 w.r.t. the identity function, the protocol in Figure 5 is a one-pass protocol, secure against a semi-honest adversary, for evaluating any read-once, layered branching program. The protocol achieves optimal privacy. For branching programs of width w, the runtime is polynomial in w and n, and it requires O(w) exponentiations per party.
In Section 6 and Appendix D, we provide instantiations of the NIZKs that are necessary to make this protocol secure against malicious adversaries. This gives us the following theorem as well.
Theorem 4.
Assuming an encryption scheme satisfying the conditions of Section 2.3 w.r.t. the identity function, and that the NIZK schemes mentioned above are secure, there is a one-pass protocol, secure against a malicious adversary, for evaluating any read-once, layered branching program. The protocol achieves optimal privacy. For branching programs of width w and output domain D, the runtime is polynomial in w, n and |D|, and it requires O(nw|D|) exponentiations per party.
Realizing the Required Encryption & NIZK Schemes
In Appendix C, we present three threshold homomorphic encryption schemes. Two are based on the DDH and DLIN assumptions, respectively, and support homomorphic evaluation of the identity function (i.e., re-randomization). The third is based on the DCR assumption, and supports homomorphic evaluation of affine functions over Z N . We rely on the first two schemes for branching programs and the last for sparse polynomials. The full details of our malicious-secure protocol are given in Appendix B. In Appendix D we describe concrete and efficient NIZK proofs, consistent with our instantiations of homomorphic threshold encryption, for the statements described in the malicious-secure protocol.
In the random oracle model, it suffices to construct appropriate Σ-protocols and then apply the Fiat-Shamir technique. We additionally use techniques of Cramer et al. [7] to compose simple Σ-protocols using logical conjunction and disjunction. The main challenge then is to show how party P i can prove that the ciphertexts C i−1 and C i are consistent, in that C i was derived from C i−1 according to the protocol (with the encryption scheme's Strip and Eval operations). We eventually reduce this problem to the task of proving that two ciphertexts encrypt the same value (under different aggregated public keys), for which we provide efficient Σ-protocols.
Our instantiations based on the DDH and DLIN assumptions are compatible with our protocol for evaluating branching programs. For these homomorphic threshold schemes, we describe efficient NIZK proofs in the standard model, using the NIZK scheme of Groth and Sahai [11] .
A Additional Definitions
PKI Model. We assume that in an initial setup phase every party registers a public and private key pair with a central authority and all the public keys are made known to everyone.
-For honest parties, these key pairs are always generated using some fixed and publicly known key generation algorithm. (In the proof of security, the simulator generates these key pairs according to the key generation algorithm.)
-Dishonest parties may choose their key pairs based on the public keys of the honest parties, with the restriction that the key pairs must constitute a valid output of the key generation algorithm. (In the proof of security, the simulator knows the private key for each dishonest party, as provided to the central authority.)
In the full version of this paper, we will consider a relaxation to the bare PKI model, where the dishonest party is not required to register a private key. The idea is to have the parties encrypt their inputs using some fixed public key, provided by the trusted set-up, instead of their individual public key.
Non-interactive Zero Knowledge. A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof scheme for an NP-relation R consists of algorithms GenCRS, Prove and Verify. We require the scheme to satisfy the following properties:
1. Completeness: For all x, w such that R(x, w) = 1, the following probability is overwhelming:
Pr[crs ← GenCRS(1 k ); Verify(crs; x, Prove(s; x, w)) = 1]
2. Adaptive Soundness: For all polynomial-time adversaries A, the following probability is negligible:
3. Zero-knowledge: There exist algorithms SimCRS and SimProof such that for all polynomialtime adversaries A and all (x, w) satisfying R(x, w) = 1, the following two distributions are indistinguishable:
B Handling Malicious Adversaries
To handle malicious adversaries, we will require each party P i to carry out the above semi-honest protocol for generating ciphertexts C i , and, in addition, to also perform the following operations:
1. P i encrypts his input under his own public key, C i $ ← Enc(pk i , x i ). 2. P i prepares a proof that ( C i , C i−1 , C i ) is "well-formed", corresponding to encryptions of values x i , y i−1 , y i such that x i ∈ D and y i = f i (y i−1 , x i ). More formally, it generates a NIZK proof π i of the following statement (using his input, secret key, and randomness as the witness):
; r) and x 1 ∈ D and C i = Enc(pk i , x i ; r ) when i = 1
) and x i ∈ D and C i = Enc(pk i , x i ; r ) and sk i is consistent with pk i when i ≥ 2 where, as before, pk i = Aggregate(pk i+1 , . . . , pk n ). 3. P i signs the message (C i , C i , π i ) under his verification key vk i . Call this signature σ i . 4. At the start of P i 's turn, the server sends all of the previous parties' messages to party P i . Upon receiving {( C j , C j , π j , σ j ) | j < i} from the server, party P i verifies the following for each j < i: -σ j is a valid signature of (C j , C j , π j ).
-π j is a valid proof of the statement described above (with respect to the value C j−1 included in the message from the server). If any such condition fails, then P i aborts; otherwise P i sends ( C i , C i , π i , σ i ) to the server.
The server also verifies these signatures and proofs from each party. If any fail to verify, then the server does not give output.
Lemma 5 (malicious security). If (Dec, Enc, Eval, Strip) is a secure threshold encryption scheme, then the above protocol is an optimally private protocol for the decomposition (f 1 , . . . , f n ), against malicious adversaries.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5). We first define the simulator and then show that it is sound. Recall that we must simulate all (and only) the messages sent from honest parties to malicious parties. We break the description of our simulator into two cases: if the server is honest, then we need to simulate the messages sent from the server to each malicious party P i ∈ I. If the server is malicious, then we need to simulate the messages sent from each honest party P i / ∈ I to the server. We let i * denote the index of the last honest party.
The simulator begins by playing the part of the certificate authority, collecting and distributing keys. He will create the keys on behalf of the honest players by using the honest key-generation protocol. We stress that the simulator knows all of the secret keys in the system.
Case 1:
If the server is honest, we must simulate his message to each party P i ∈ I. Recall, the server sends to P i the set of messages {( C j , C j , π j , σ j )} j<i , where ( C j , C j , π j , σ j ) is the message the server received from P j in round j.
For each P i ∈ I, taken in order, the simulator does the following:
-message simulation: The simulator must create the message sent from the honest server to P i . Specifically, for each j < i, the simulator must generate ( C j , C j , π j , σ j ). If P j ∈ I, then the simulator simply uses the message that P j had previously sent to the server in round j. If P j / ∈ I, and the simulator has not yet generated ( C j , C j , π j , σ j ) in a previous step, then it generates these values according to the protocol, using input x j = 0. (Here we use the fact that the simulator chose the secret keys of the honest party P j .) -input extraction: The simulator then receives ( C i , C i , π i , σ i ) from P i , which is intended for the server. He verifies that π i is a valid proof, and that σ i is a valid signature. If not, he aborts the simulation. Otherwise, he uses sk i to decrypt C i , thereby extracting input x i . He sends x i to the trusted party, and stores ( C i , C i , π i , σ i ) for simulating later players.
The simulator has now extracted x i for each P i ∈ I. He submits these values to the trusted party, and outputs the views of each corrupt P i .
Case 2:
If the server is corrupt, then we only need to simulate the view of the server. Specifically, we have to simulate messages sent from honest parties to the server. We do so as follows:
-message simulation (i < i * ): For every i / ∈ I with i < i * , the simulator creates ( C i , C i , π i , σ i ) honestly, using input x i = 0. (Here we use the fact that the simulator chose the secret keys of the honest party P i .) He sends this value to the server on behalf of P i .
-input extraction: In round i * the server sends a message intended for P i * . Recall, this message has the form: {( C j , C j , π j , σ j )} j<i * . For j < i * , P j ∈ I, the simulator verifies that π j is a valid proof, and that σ j is a valid signature. If not, he aborts the simulation. Otherwise, he extracts input x j from ( C j , C j , π j , σ j ) using P j 's secret key. For j > i * , P j ∈ I, he sets x j = 0 (these inputs are ignored by the trusted party anyway). He sends {x j } j∈I to the trusted party. -message simulation (i * ): Recall that in the HLP model, the trusted party ignores the inputs from players j > i * and sends y i * =f i * (x 1 , . . . , x i * ) to the simulator. When this happens, the simulator generates C i * ← Enc( pk i * , y i * ); C i * ← Enc(pk i * , 0); π i * as a simulated NIZK proof; and σ i * as a signature on these values. The simulator sends ( C i * , C i * , π i * , σ i * ) to the server on behalf of P i * , then halts outputting the view of the corrupt server.
To show the validity of the simulator, we consider a sequence of hybrid interactions H 1 , . . . , H n+1 . H n+1 is the real interaction in which honest parties execute with their true input; H j is the same as H j+1 except that if P j is honest and j ≤ n, then P j runs as in the simulation described above. Then H 1 is identical to our simulation. Clearly H j ≈ H j+1 when P j is corrupt, so it suffices to show that H j ≈ H j+1 when P j is honest.
If an honest party P j rejects any of the NIZK proofs or signatures received from the server, then H j ≈ H j+1 trivially, so we condition on the event that these proofs & signatures are valid. By the adaptive soundness of the NIZK scheme and the correctness properties of the homomorphic encryption scheme, we have that C j−1 is in the support of Enc( pk j−1 ,f j−1 (x 1 , . . . , x j−1 )). Also by the soundness of the NIZK scheme, whenever P is corrupt, the ciphertext C is a valid encryption of x under pk . In the PKI model, the simulator has access to the secret keys of the corrupt parties. Thus the simulator can compute the value y j−1 =f j−1 (x 1 , . . . , x j−1 ).
As before, let i * denote the index of the last honest party. We show that H j ≈ H j+1 in the case of j = i * < n + 1 (i.e., the server is corrupt). Consider the following sequence of intermediate hybrids:
1. H i * +1 is the same as H i * +1 except that π i * is generated as a simulated NIZK proof. Since the statement being proven is true, we have that
2. H i * is the same as H i * +1 except that C i * is generated as
. By the soundness property mentioned above, and by the correctness properties of the encryption scheme, we see that the two ways of generating C i * are statistically indistinguishable, hence H i * +1 ≈ s H i * .
We now consider the case where j < i * . Again we consider the following sequence of intermediate hybrids:
1. H (1) j+1 is the same as H j+1 except that π j is generated as a simulated NIZK proof. Since the statement being proven is true, we have that
j+1 is the same as H (1) j+1 except that C j is generated as C j
. By a similar argument as above, we have H
j+1 is the same as H (2) j+1 except that C j is generated as C j $ ← Enc( pk j , f j (y j−1 , 0)) and C j is generated as C j $ ← Enc(pk j , 0). Note that pk j includes pk i * , the public key of an honest party. Since neither sk j nor sk i * are included in the adversary's view, we have H
j+1 by the (threshold) semantic security of the encryption scheme.
H (4)
j+1 is the same as H (3) j+1 except that C j is generated as C j
Similar to above, we have that H
5. H j is the same as H (4) j+1 except that the proof π j is generated honestly. Note that the statement being proven is true -party P j is indeed carrying out the protocol honestly with effective input 0. Thus, similar to above, we have H (4) j+1 ≈ H j .
C Realizing Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we present three threshold homomorphic encryption schemes, similar to those given in [12] . Two are based on the DDH and DLIN assumptions, respectively, and support homomorphic evaluation of the identity function (i.e., re-randomization). The third is based on the DCR assumption, and supports homomorphic evaluation of affine functions over Z N . We rely on the first two schemes for branching programs and the last for sparse polynomials.
C.1 Instantiations from DDH
Let G be a group of prime order q specified using a generator g. The DDH assumption asserts that g ab is pseudorandom given g, g a , g b where g 
D Instantiating Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
When players are malicious, we use a NIZK proof to enforce correct behavior (cf. Appendix B).
In this section, we show how to realize these NIZK proofs. In Section D.1, we work in the random oracle model, so it suffices to obtain Σ-protocols and then apply the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. The idea is to break down the relation we need to enforce as the conjunction and disjunction of DDH relations (or variants there-of) and then apply the techniques of Cramer et al. [7] to combine these individual relations. In Section D.2, we demonstrate how to efficiently instantiate the NIZK proofs in bilinear groups without random oracles via Groth-Sahai proofs [11] .
Overview. Recall that our goal is to enforce that ( C i , C i−1 , C i ) satisfies the following relation:
) and x i ∈ D and C i = Enc(pk i , x i ; r ) and sk i is consistent with pk i for i ≥ 2
where, as before, pk i = Aggregate(pk i+1 , . . . , pk n ). Clearly, we can write this statement as the disjunction of |D| statements, ranging over x i ∈ D. That is, we fix x i ∈ D, and show:
and C i = Enc(pk i , x i ; r ) and sk i is consistent with pk i for i ≥ 2
We will provide a Σ-protocol for this simpler statement, and then use the techniques of Cramer et al. [7] to combine these into a single protocol for the disjunction. In the case of branching programs, f i (·, x i ) is essentially just the identity function. For polynomials, f i (·, x i ) is an affine function.
D.1 NIZK in the Random Oracle Model
NIZK for Branching Programs. For simplicity, let us work with boolean domains for now and our ElGamal encryption instantiation. It suffices to show how a player can prove that he is behaving consistently with input 0 (respectively 1). Recall, player P i sends |L i | ciphertexts to the server in this protocol, each corresponding to a node in layer L i of the branching program. We focus for now on a single node v ∈ L i , and the denote the corresponding ciphertext by C i . Technically, the malicious player will have to prove the conjunction over |L i | of the statements we describe below, in order to prove that all |L i | ciphertexts were correctly formed. Let u ∈ L i−1 be the node such that (u, v) ∈ E, and φ E (u, v) = 0. Let C i−1 denote the ciphertext corresponding to this node that player P i−1 sent to the server in the previous round. Recall that in our protocol for branching programs, f i (·, 0) is simply the identity function, so we can simplify the NIZK statement to be the following.
( C i is an encryption of 0 under pk i ) AND ( C i and C i−1 are encryptions of the same value under pk i and pk i−1 respectively )
The first statement corresponds to just proving that C i is a valid DDH tuple (using as witness randomness for encryption). For completeness, we provide the appropriate Σ-protocol in Figure 6 . Let us now focus on the second part. We may write:
We stress that P i knows (r i , sk i ) but not r or M ; here, r i denotes the randomness for Strip. Now, observe that:
i ) For a fixed generator g, write dh(g a , g b ) to denote g ab . Therefore, we can write ψ i /ψ i−1 as
Indeed, P i can prove that ψ i /ψ i−1 is of this form by using (sk i , r i ) as his witness. More specifically, he must prove that the following tuple is of the form (
Letting a = ( sk i , r), and b = (r i , −sk i ), party P i uses b as his witness in the Σ-protocol of Figure  7 .
Proof of DDH Membership in DCR groups Inputs: The public parameters are (N, g). The language is
Both parties have access to the instance (g, h, u, v). The prover P also has the witness w. and sends e to P . 3. P responds with z = r + we. V checks that (g z , h z ) = (g0u e , h0v e ).
Fig. 6. A Σ-protocol for proving DDH membership in DCR groups
NIZK for Polynomials In our protocol for computing polynomials, party P i receives encryptions of a set of coefficients, denoted by C
We let m 1 , . . . , m denote the corresponding plaintexts. As before, P i creates a ciphertext C i and proves that it is correctly formed for some input x i . He does this by proving a disjunction over |D| statements, one for each possible input value. Also as before, he may actually have to create more than one ciphertext for each possible input (depending on how many coefficients he is expected to add together after substituting his own input). We will simply focus on a single one of these ciphertexts, and simply note that he will actually have to prove that all are correctly formed for some input. For simplicity, then, we assume that the monomials corresponding to m 1 , . . . , m each have the same degree in each variable other than x i , and, consequently, all coefficients are collapsed into the single one encrypted by C i .
Intuitively, P i must prove the following statement, given some publicly known values a 1 , . . . , a , where each a j corresponds to x Let's denote this by C i−1 . Now the statement above can be reduced to the one we saw for branching programs. Specifically, P i simply has to prove that C i and C i−1 are encryptions of the same value, under pk i and pk i−1 respectively.
Proof of -DHMULT Membership
Inputs: The public parameters are (G, q, g). The language is {(g a , g b , u) ∈ G × G × G : u = g a·b }. Both parties have access to the instance (g a , g b , u). The prover P also has the witness b.
1. P chooses a random r $ ← Z q , computes c := g a·r and sends (g r , c) to the verifier V .
2. V chooses a random e $ ← Zq and sends e to P . 3. P responds with z := r + eb ∈ Z q . V checks that g z = g r · (g b ) e and g a·z = c · u e .
(where · in the exponent refers to dot product, and for G-vectors denotes entry-wise product.) Fig. 7 . A Σ-protocol for proving -DHMULT membership
D.2 Instantiations via Groth-Sahai Proofs
We can remove the use of random oracles by using the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system [11] . This proof system is compatible with both our DDH and DLIN instantiations (used in our protocol for evaluating branching programs).
SXDH instantiation. Here, we have a pairing e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . Informally, the SXDH assumption is that DDH is hard in both G 1 and in G 2 . We can then instantiate our protocol for branching programs using ElGamal encryptions in G 1 , where DDH holds.
We first show how to use Groth-Sahai proofs to prove the kinds of clauses needed for the NP statement. Let h be any fixed generator of G 2 . Then we have: sk j is consistent with pk j ⇔ e(pk j , h) · e(g −1 , h sk j ) = 1 ( C 0 , C 1 ) = Enc(pk j , m; r ) ⇔ e( C 0 , h) · e(g −1 , h r ) = 1 e( C 1 , h) · e (pk j ) −1 , h r · e(m −1 , h) = 1 (C 0 , C 1 ) = Strip( pk, sk j , (X, Y ); r) ⇔ e(C 0 , h) · e(X −1 , h) · e(g −1 , h r ) = 1 e(C 1 , h) · e(Y −1 , h) · e(X, h sk j ) · e ( pk j+1 ) −1 , h r = 1
In the terminology of Groth-Sahai, the values sk j , r, r are variables (witness values), and all other values appearing in these pairing-product equations are either public parts of the NP statement, or can be easily computed from them. Because the right-hand side of each equation is the identity element 1 ∈ G T , the Groth-Sahai scheme can prove them in zero-knowledge (not just witness hiding).
For notational simplicity here, we consider a boolean input domain. Let Φ b denote the NP statement that the prover behaved consistently with input b. Thus it suffices to show how to prove the statement Φ 0 ∨ Φ 1 .
Groth-Sahai proofs natively support proving conjunctions of pairing-product equations, possibly reusing variables. Thus Φ 0 (resp. Φ 1 ) can be expressed as a conjunction of the pairing-product equations given above: As before, all pairing-product equations have right-hand side 1 ∈ G T , so can be proven in zeroknowledge.
DLIN instantiation.
Consider an instantiation of our protocol for branching programs in which we use our DLIN threshold encryption in G 1 . We use the same basic approach as above, and it suffices to show the following pairing-product equations. Below, sk j = (x, y); pk j = (u, v, w); pk = ({(u i , v i )} i≤j , W ); and W = i<j w i :
sk j is consistent with pk j ⇔ e(w, h) · e(u −1 , h 
